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In 1970, Pennsylvania adopted comprehensive legislation afford-
ing public employees the right to organize and bargain collectively.
Act 195,1 also known as the Public Employee Relations Act, extends
the right to strike to most public employees,2 including teachers.
Since Act 195's implementation, there has been recurrent debate
concerning the appropriateness of teacher strikes as a means of
resolving bargaining impasses in public education. For example,
State Senator Michael Fisher, Chairman of a Senate task force com-
missioned in 1984 to study the impact of Act 195 on public schools
observed that "[t]here is . . . a very real concern for how disruptive
school strikes have been on those who can least afford the disruption,
that is, our children in school."3
At present, forty-one states and the District of Columbia have
legislation or regulations providing for public employee bargaining."
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versity of Colorado; Assistant Professor of Labor Studies, The Pennsylvania State University;
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I. Act of July 23, 1970 (Public Employe Relations Act) Pub. L. No. 195-563 (codi-
fied as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §§ 1101.101-.2301 (Purdon Supp. 1985)) [hereinaf-
ter cited.as "Act 195"].
2. See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
3. Harrisburg Patriot, June 20, 1984, at Al, col. 5 (statement of Senator Michael
Fisher, R-Allegheny).
4. For an examination of the development of bargaining legislation as of 1977, see
Schneider, Public-Sector Labor Legislation - An Evolutionary Analysis [hereinafter cited as
Public-Sector Legislation] in PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING (B. Aaron, J. Grodin & J. Stern,
ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING]. A current compilation of state
bargaining laws is contained in the summary of state and local programs, [Reference File]
Gov'T. EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 51:1011 et seq. (1985). New Mexico permits bargaining
under regulations issued by the State Personnel Board. Id. at 51.4011. The most recent bar-
gaining statutes were enacted in 1984, when Illinois and Ohio adopted comprehensive legisla-
tion, see also ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 48, §§ 1601-1627 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN., §§ 4117.01-.23 (Baldwin 1983 & Supp. 1985). Arizona, Arkansas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia and West Virginia have no af-
firmative provisions concerning public negotiations. Gov'T. EMPL. REL. REP., supra. Colorado
authorizes bargaining by two groups of public employees, transit workers and sewage district
Only ten states, however, authorize strikes by government workers to
resolve bargaining impasses.5 The remaining states mandate alterna-
tive methods of dispute resolution, such as binding interest arbitra-
tion. Despite its prevalence in bargaining systems, however, arbitra-
tion remains an unsatisfactory means of resolving impasses in public
sector negotiations. Most important, arbitration is undemocratic in
operation and deprives the citizen of any meaningful voice in the
outcome of the bargaining process.
Public sector bargaining, particularly when it involves a subject
as sensitive and critical as public education, has an inherent political
dimension. Existing techniques for resolving negotiation impasses are
inadequate to accommodate this political dimension, and strikes as
well as arbitration can thwart the process of democratic decision-
making. Pennsylvania's teacher strike experience convincingly dem-
onstrates the detrimental consequences of lengthy teacher strikes.
This article advances a model of impasse resolution which offers
a preferable alternative to teacher strikes and binding arbitration.
The "Referendum Model" corrects the political distortion intrinsic
to the strike and arbitration methods of dispute resolution by elimi-
nating the threat of strikes while simultaneously providing an oppor-
tunity for public participation in the negotiations process.
The article first reviews the impasse techniques adopted in Act
195. Next, it examines the public controversy surrounding teacher
strikes and their effect on students and parents. The arbitration al-
ternative is then criticized from the perspective of political theory.
Part IV of the article presents the Referendum Model with ac-
companying commentary. Part V analyzes the Model in theoretical
terms, with particular emphasis on political governance in local
school systems. In conclusion, it is argued that the Model is a supe-
rior means of accommodating the interests of teachers in collective
bargaining and the interests of citizens in quality public education.
employees. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1-4(12) (supp. 1982), 32-4-502(25) (1973). The statute
arguably permits strikes by those employees. Originally, the law did not contemplate public
employee collective bargaining, having been enacted in 1946 in response to the Wagner Act.
See Hogler, The Regional Transportation District Strike and the Colorado Labor Peace Act:
A Study in Public Sector Collective Bargaining, 54 COLO. L. REV. 203 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Regional Transportation District Strike].
5. Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Wisconsin,
Ohio, and Illinois permit strikes by designated public employees. For a summary of the statu-
tory provisions in the first eight states, see Hanslowe & Acierno, The Law and Theory of
Strikes by Government Employees, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1055, 1079 (1982). The statutes
governing public employee strikes in Ohio and Illinois are cited at supra note 4.
6. For an overview of impasse procedures, see Kochan, Dynamics of Dispute Resolu-
tion in the Public Sector, in PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING, supra note 4 at 150 [hereinafter
cited as Dispute Resolution].
II. Impasses Under Act 195
A. An Overview of the Dispute Procedures
In authorizing public employee strikes, Act 195 adopted a
highly innovative approach to collective negotiations.' Legislation en-
acted in other states prior to 1970 prohibited strikes but substituted
alternative methods of dispute resolution.8 Typically, those proce-
dures relied on mediation, factfinding and binding interest arbitra-
tion, all of which involve the intervention of a third party in the bar-
gaining process.9  The Pennsylvania legislature incorporated
mediation, factfinding and arbitration into Act 195 and further de-
termined that a right to strike as the final step of impasse resolution
would strengthen the negotiations process.' 0
The resolution of impasses under Act 195 involves a series of
mandatory procedures followed by several voluntary options availa-
ble to the parties." The first step in impasse resolution is mediation,
which the parties must invoke if an agreement is not reached within
a specified period after commencement of negotiations. Mediation is
initiated by written notice to the Pennsylvania Bureau of Mediation,
which thereupon furnishes the services of a mediator at no cost to
the parties." The procedure is mandatory. Once begun, mediation
continues until the parties reach an agreement. After a specified pe-
riod of time, however, the Bureau of Mediation notifies the Pennsyl-
vania Labor Relations Board of the impasse. The Board may appoint
7. See Public-Sector Legislation, supra note 4 at 200-03, in which Schneider de-
scribes the historical context underlying the no-strike approach, such as New York's, and the
Pennsylvania strike model. The Pennsylvania legislation was a radical departure from the con-
ventional collective bargaining practices then prevailing in public employment.
8. In 1962, Wisconsin enacted a bargaining statute covering municipal employees. Be-
tween 1965 and 1967, six additional states adopted legislation modeled after the federal Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, but without the right to strike. Schneider describes this as the
"watershed" period of public sector bargaining. Public-Sector Legislation, supra note 4, at
197-200.
9. See Dispute Resolution, supra note 6, at 170-87 for a description and evaluation of
these third party procedures. See also, T. KOCHAN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND INDUS-
TRIAL RELATIONS 272-305 (1980) [hereinafter cited as COLLECTIVE BARGAINING].
10. "The collective bargaining process will be strengthened if this qualified right to
strike is recognized. It will be some curb on the possible intransigence of an employer; and the
limitations on the right to strike will serve notice on the employee that there are limits to the
hardships that he can impose." GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVISE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
LAW OF PENNSYLVANIA, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, reprinted in 251 GOV'T. EMPL.
REL. REP. (BNA) E-1, E-3 (1968) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION].
II. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §§ 1101.801-.806a (Purdon Supp. 1985). The statute also
contains explicit safeguards to prevent undue danger to the public welfare in the event of a
work action.
12. Id. Mediators perform a variety of functions in assisting the parties to reach a
voluntary agreement. A detailed treatment of the process is set forth in W. SIMKIN, MEDIA-
TION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1971). For a comparison of mediation
in the private and public sectors, see D. KOLB, THE MEDIATORS (1983). Kolb concludes that
public sector mediators involved in private sector negotiations are primarily "orchestrators"
concerned with the procedural aspects of bargaining. KOLB at 23-45.
a factfinding panel, which is empowered to conduct hearings and is-
sue subpoenas. The panel will issue a written report recommending
disposition of impassed items, but the recommendations are not
binding on the parties. 13
Within ten days from the date of the panel's decision, a party
must accept or reject the factfinder's recommendations and promptly
notify the Board and the opposing party of its choice. If the parties
reject the recommendations, the panel "shall publicize its findings of
fact and recommendations."' 4 The parties then have an additional
ten days in which to reconsider the rejection. Failure by a party to
submit to the mediation or factfinding procedures "shall be deemed
a refusal to bargain in good faith," and constitutes grounds for issu-
ance of an unfair practice complaint. 15 Nothing in the mandatory
procedures precludes an agreement to submit the impasse to volun-
tary binding arbitration.
Following exhaustion of the mandatory procedures, disputes are
governed by Article X of the Act. 6 This article prohibits strikes by
guards at prisons or mental hospitals and by employees "directly in-
volved with and necessary to the functioning of the courts." It also
prescribes appropriate employer actions in the event of such
strikes.'" Act 11118 regulates police officers and firefighters not spe-
cifically covered by Act 195. These public employees, while denied
the right to strike under Act 195, are nevertheless afforded a right to
arbitrate bargaining impasses.
Provided the employees are not explicitly prohibited from strik-
ing, and the parties have exhausted the Act's mediation and factfind-
ing procedures, a strike "shall not be prohibited unless or until such
a strike creates a clear and present danger or threat to the health,
safety or welfare of the public."' 19 If the public employer believes
that the strike exceeds the ambit of legislative tolerance, the em-
ployer may initiate an action for appropriate relief in the court of
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.802 (Purdon Supp. 1985). For an evaluation of the
factfinding process in dispute resolution, see COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, supra note 9, at 292-
297.
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.802(2) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
15. Id. at § 1101.803. With respect to unfair practices arising out of the impasse proce-
dures, the board "shall be empowered to petition the court of competent jurisdiction for appro-
priate relief or restraining order." Id. at § 1101.1401.
16. Id. at § 1101.1001.
17. Id. at § 1101.1001. In the event of a strike by guards or court employees, "the
public employer shall forthwith initiate in the court of common pleas of the jurisdiction where
the strike occurs, an action for appropriate equitable relief including but not limited to injunc-
tions." If the strike involves Commonwealth employees in the designated occupations, the chief
legal officer or attorney general shall initiate the action.
18. Act of June 24, 1968, Pub. L. No. 111-237 (codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, §§ 217.1-.10 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
common pleas where the strike occurs. An injunction, however, will
not issue simply because the strike disrupts routine procedures, or
because the employer cannot furnish services.2" Moreover, the strike
must actually be in progress before issuance of an injunction.21 Typi-
cally, the court will consider a number of factors in determining the
merits of the action, including the population percentage affected by
the strike, its interference with other statutorily mandated objectives,
loss of wages of nonstrikers, and potential and actual violence.
22 If
the court enjoins the strike, refusal of the employee or the labor or-
ganization to comply with the injunction may result in a variety of
sanctions for contempt. The employee may be subject to discharge, a
fine, or imprisonment, and the organization may be fined for each
day it is in contempt. 3
In general, Act 195 accommodates the various interests affected
by public negotiations. It is premised on the assumption that a "lim-
ited and carefully defined right to strike [acts] as a safety valve that
will in fact prevent strikes. 224 Nevertheless, despite Pennsylvania's
example, the overwhelming majority of states permitting public bar-
gaining reject the strike as a means of impasse resolution.2 5 In the
view of legislators in most states, work stoppages by public employ-
ees are unconscionable.2" Legislative reluctance to endorse public
employee strikes lies in the nature of our governmental system. Im-
passe resolution methods, including the strike, have significant conse-
quences for the citizens of a community, and any proposed modifica-
tion of bargaining legislation must consider the implications for the
political process.
B. The Political Impact of Teacher Strikes
The ten-year period following the enactment of Act 195 in 1970
20. See, e.g., Armstrong Educ. Ass'n. v. Armstrong School Dist., 5 Pa. Commw. 378,
91 A.2d 120 (1972) (danger must be real or actual; disruption of routine school administrative
procedures and sports activities, and community unrest did not justify issuance of an
injunction).
21. E.g., Division 85, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County,
16 Pa. Commw. 50, 329 A.2d 292 (1974) (court lacks jurisdiction to grant equitable relief
until strike is in being).
22. See generally Decker, Right to Strike for Pennsylvania's Public Employees-Its
Scope, Limits, and Ramifications for the Public Employer, 17 DuQ. L. REv. 755 (1978-79).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1007-.1008 (Purdons 1985 supp). The statute also
sets forth various factors courts consider in assessing penalties for contempt, including unfair
labor practices committed by the employer during bargaining, the extent of "wilful defiance"
by the employee or organization, the harm caused to the public by the strike, and the ability of
the employee or the union to pay.
24. GOVeRNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 10, at E-3 (emphasis omitted).
25. See supra note 4.
26. See. e.g., IowA CODE § 20.12 (1977) ("It shall be unlawful for any public em-
ployee or any employee organization, directly or indirectly, to induce, instigate, encourage,
authorize, ratify, or participate in a strike against any public employer.").
witnessed an average of 31 school district strikes per year, with an
average strike length of 13.1 days.2 7 The 1972-73 school year was
the peak year of strike activity in terms of direct impact on students
and teachers. During that period, public school strikes affected
421,782 pupils and 19,438 teachers.28 Measured in terms of number
of work stoppages, activity was greatest in 1975-76, when 54 strikes
occurred.2 9 The number of days lost to strikes was highest in 1976-
77, with a total number of 762.30 While strike activity generally has
declined from those levels, in 1984 Pennsylvania experienced 16 per
cent of school strikes nationwide. Furthermore, since the enactment
of Act 195, Pennsylvania has had a total of 22.9 per cent of school
strikes in the United States. 1
To evaluate Act 195, the Commonwealth sponsored a Commis-
sion, which issued its final report in 1978.32 Although the Commis-
sion majority recommended no change in the law regarding teacher
strikes, the minority proposed elimination of the teachers' right to
strike and substitution of compulsory binding arbitration as the
method of impasse resolution. 3 The minority reasoned that:
There is no way to resolve the inherent conflict between the
right of teachers to strike and the right of students to "a thor-
ough and efficient system of education."13 4 The ability of teach-
ers to disrupt the educational process and interfere with the stu-
dents' constitutionally guaranteed right to an education must be
removed . . . . Eliminating the right of teachers to strike is con-
sistent with the [express statutory] public policy of Pennsylvania
insofar as the collective bargaining process must not be allowed
to supersede the right of the citizens of this Commonwealth to
"a thorough and efficient system of education."3 5
The minority report underscores the point that educational bar-
27. H. BENEDETTO & P. VAN BRIGGLE, SUMMARY OF STRIKES, 1970-1980 1983 (sup-
plemented through 1981/82 school year).
28. Id. at 14-15. In both the 1980-81 and 1981-82 school years, the total number of
teachers affected by strikes (27,899 and 24,387, respectively) exceeded the 1972-73 figure.
However, the combined number of students and teachers affected by strike activity is greater
for the 1972-73 year than for any other year.
29. Id. at 18.
30. Id. at 19. The least number of days lost due to strikes was 278 during the 1970-71
school year.
31. PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOL BOARDS ASS'N, 23 INFORMATION LEGISLATIVE SERVICE 2,
4 (chart 8) (Aug. 30, 1985).
32. GOVERNOR'S STUDY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA (1978) [hereinafter cited as RECOMMENDATIONS].
33. Id. at 31-32.
34. PA. CONST. art. III, § 14 ("The General Assembly shall provide for the mainte-
nance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public education to serve the needs of
the Commonwealth.").
35. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 32, at 31-32.
gaining occurs in a politically sensitive environment and that teach-
ers, students, parents and school administrators represent different
interest groups with different and often conflicting goals.
An analysis in the Harrisburg Patriot-News on September 4,
1983 reported that "[t]he target of the legislative mood to revise Act
195 is clearly aimed at public school teachers. What has lawmakers
most upset is the fact that during the 13 years that Act 195 has been
the law, there have been about 600 teacher strikes.""6 The Patriot
article indicates that teachers are more prone to strike activity than
other municipal employees. Albert Unger, Director of Governmental
Relations for the Pennsylvania School Boards Association, was inter-
viewed for the report. Unger claimed that salary and fringe benefit
gains for teachers in states without collective bargaining laws or
without the right to strike were equal to or greater than those in
Pennsylvania. Unger described the belief that unions required the
strike weapon to attain bargaining goals as a "fallacy."3
During the 1983 legislative session, fifteen bills proposing modi-
fications to Act 195's negotiations process were introduced in the
General Assembly.38 The bills proposed altering the bargaining time-
table, abolishing strikes and substituting binding arbitration, prohib-
iting strikes unless more than fifty percent of the union membership
votes to strike, and permitting residents of affected school districts to
seek injunctions, against teachers' strikes.39 The legislature failed to
enact any of these proposals.
In June 1984, a Senate task force created to study the impact of
Act 195 on public schools issued a report recommending changes in
educational bargaining procedures. 0 The recommendations included
shortening the bargaining period from 150 days to 90 days, strength-
ening the mediation and factfinding procedures and restricting the
school district's opportunities to make up school days lost due to
strikes in order to meet the 180 day standard school year.4 ' None of
these measures were enacted during the 1984 legislative session.
In August, 1984, the Conemaugh Valley Board of Sclool Direc-
tors adopted a resolution requesting the state legislature to eliminate
the right of teachers to strike. Anthony Moran, Superintendent of
36. Harrisburg Patriot-News, Sept. 4, 1983, at DI, col. 1.
37. Id. at col. 2. Notably, Unger's assertion runs contrary to the philosophy underlying
both the National Labor Relations Act and public sector labor laws.
38. Id. The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME) and the Pennsylvania State Education Association (PSEA) were the major unions
lobbying against any proposed modifications to Act 195.
39. Id. at cols. 2-5 ("There May Be 15 Ways to Change 195"). At present, residents
do not have standing to petition a court for injunctive relief.
40. Harrisburg Patriot-News, June 20, 1984, at Al, col. I.
41. Id. at A7, col. I.
the Conemaugh Valley School District, also contacted other school
districts to solicit support for the Conemaugh resolution.42 Moran
contends that Act 195 is unconstitutional as it pertains to teachers
since teacher strikes are inconsistent with the constitutional mandate
that the Commonwealth provide a "thorough and efficient system of
public education."4 Leon Hickman, the principal author of the 1968
Report that lead to the enactment of Act 195 shares this view."'
Empirical evidence suggests that work stoppages in the state's
educational system are negatively correlated with student achieve-
ment. A 1981 study analyzed student achievement as measured by
the Educational Quality Assessment instrument (EQA) in 134
school districts, 46 of which experienced strikes.45 The study popula-
tion included 538 elementary schools, 183 junior high/middle
schools and 148 senior high schools. The results indicated that stu-
dents in districts in which teacher strikes lasted between nineteen
and twenty-four days achieved significantly lowered reading scores
at all grade levels. Students in districts with strikes lasting more
than thirteen days tended to have "significantly lower mathematics
scores than students in districts with strikes lasting twelve days or
less, or no strikes. ' 48 Thus, lengthy strikes adversely affected both
reading and math achievement, while shorter strikes consistently had
a more negative impact on mathematics scores. The authors con-
cluded that "[riegardless of the differences . . . both test areas indi-
cate a negative effect of strikes on overall achievement and in respect
to the length and timing of the strike. 47
In summary, teachers' strikes have a substantial political im-
pact. They generate considerable tensions within the educational sys-
tem, tensions that may intensify when the collective bargaining pro-
cess is resistant to citizen influence. Taxpayers within a school
district may well conclude that the system is beyond their direct or
indirect control and that they have little meaningful recourse from
42. Letter by Anthony Moran (December 18, 1984) (copy of resolution attached). The
letter suggests that other school boards adopt a similar resolution and forward it to the appro-
priate legislators, the Pennsylvania School Boards Associations, and the Governor.
43. Id.
44. The 1983 Harrisburg Patriot-News article reported that Hickman supports the ab-
olition of teachers' right to strike. Hickman also reportedly has stated on another occasion that
"It]he constitutional right of our children to an education is on a collision course with compet-
ing demands of school teachers for adequate salaries and the need of school boards to balance
their budgets without unacceptable demands upon the taxpayers." Harrisburg Patriot-News,
Sept. 4, 1983, at DI, col. 3.
45. Caldwell & Moskalski, The Effects of School District Strikes on Student Achieve-
ment, 2 Gov'T. UNION REV. 3 (1981).
46. Id. at 13.
47. The authors argue that state legislatures should consider the relationship between
strikes and student achievement: "Although collective bargaining is a useful vehicle for reach-
ing contract agreement, impasse resolution techniques need to be improved to lessen the num-
ber and intensity of public school strikes." Id. at 14.
the results of negotiations.
III. Arbitration as an Alternative to Strikes
A. The Arbitration Process
Arbitration, a method of impasse resolution relatively effective
at preventing strikes,4" may appear to be the preferable means of
dispute resolution in educational bargaining. Like factfinding, arbi-
tration involves a hearing before an arbitrator or a panel of arbitra-
tors. The parties present evidence and arguments, following which
the arbitrator makes a written disposition of each impassed item.
The arbitrator's determination is final and binding and constitutes
the terms of the parties' labor agreement. Typically, the award will
not be set aside by a court unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or lack-
ing a rational basis. 9
One variation of arbitration used in several states is "final-of-
fer" arbitration. Under this method, the arbitrator's choice of sub-
stantive provisions is limited to the last offer made by one of the
parties. The arbitrator may select the final offer on either an issue-
by-issue or package basis, but the arbitrator does not have the dis-
cretion to compromise.
50
In theory, final-offer arbitration precludes an arbitrator from
"splitting the difference" between the parties' positions and is in-
tended to encourage bargaining by forcing the parties to offer their
best package prior to proceeding to arbitration. As one commentator
observed:
[F]inal-offer arbitration attempts to increase the costs of disa-
greement by eliminating arbitral discretion. Since the arbitrator
must select one or the other final offer, the parties are induced
to develop ever more reasonable positions in the hope of winning
the award, and these mutual attempts to win neutral approval
should result in the parties being so close together they will cre-
ate their own settlement. The convergent movements should re-
sult because of the fear that the arbitrator will select the other
side's offer. 51
Thus, the "potentially severe costs of disagreement" assure that fi-
nal-offer arbitration functions as a "strikelike" mechanism.52
48. Collective Bargaining, supra note 9, at 295.
49. See, e.g., Caso v. Coffey, 41 N.Y. 2d 153, 359 N.E.2d 683 (1976); see also Craver,
The Judicial Enforcement of Public Sector Interest Arbitration, 21 B.C.L. REv. 557 (1980).
50. For a study of the method in three states, see J. STERN, et al., FINAL OFFER ARBI-
TRATION: THE EFFECTS ON PUBLIC SAFETY EMPLOYEE BARGAINING (1975).
51. Feuille, Final Offer Arbitration and the Chilling Effect, 14 INDUS. REL. 302, 304-
05 (1975).
52. Id. at 305.
In settling disputes, the arbitrator's role is to formulate an
agreement which as nearly as possible approximates that which the
parties would have reached. One eminent arbitrator explained that:
Arbitration of contract terms differs radically from arbitration
of grievances. The latter calls for a judicial determination of ex-
isting contract rights; the former calls for a determination, upon
considerations of policy, fairness, [sic] and expediency, of what
the contract rights ought to be. In submitting this case to arbi-
tration, the parties have merely extended their negotiations -
they have left it to this board to determine what they should, by
negotiations, have agreed upon. We take it that the fundamental
issue is: What should the parties themselves, as reasonable men,
have voluntarily agreed to?53
In order to arrive at a reasoned settlement, arbitrators rely on
standards developed through prior adjudications in the field, al-
though they are not bound to previous decisions. These standards
''are not pulled out of the air - nor are they artificially created.
They are, generally speaking, the very same ones that are used by
the parties in their negotiations. 5 Furthermore these standards in-
clude prevailing practices within an industry or area, the nature of
the work under consideration, the employer's ability to pay, produc-
tivity and general economic conditions. In some instances, the stan-
dards are incorporated into the enabling legislation. Michigan, for
example, adopted specific legislation pertaining to arbitration for po-
lice and firefighters." Michigan's statute establishes a panel of quali-
fied arbitrators, from which the parties select arbitrators. The statute
mandates the arbitrators' consideration of certain enumerated fac-
tors in resolving economic issues. These factors include the interests
and welfare of the public, the financial ability of the governmental
unit, comparable wages and working conditions of other similarly sit-
uated public and private employees in comparable communities, the
consumer price index or cost of living and the overall present com-
pensation of the employees."
53. Twin City Rapid Transit Co., 7 Lab. Arb. & Dispute Res. 845, 858 (McCoy,
1947).
54. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 745 (3d ed. 1972).
55. MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 423.231-.246 (1976).
56. Id. at § 423.239. For an examination of Michigan's arbitration experience under
the statute, see Kruger, Interest Arbitration Revisited, 36 LAB. L.J. 497 (1985). Kruger's
study substantiates the thesis that arbitration is not an acceptable method of resolving public
sector bargaining disputes. For example, Kruger notes that:
The City of Detroit has released a position paper detailing its criticism of
Act 312 [cited supra at note 55] and requesting that it be repealed. The city,
possibly by sheer exposure, has been the most arbitrated public employer since
the adoption of Act 312. It believes that Act 312 "has been a failure, not so
much because it has failed to prevent strikes, but rather because it has caused
greater problems than those it was meant to eliminate." The city favors the com-
Generally, then, arbitration appears to be a well-developed, es-
tablished procedure which produces outcomes similar to the results
of successful negotiations. In addition to preventing strikes, arbitra-
tion may contribute other positive aspects to the bargaining system.
For example, arbitration may bring a measure of "expertise" to the
relationship. Arbitrators are objective, impartial, knowledgeable ex-
perts capable of drafting agreements which may be superior to those
the parties might themselves have devised. Further, the presence of a
neutral arbitrator assures a level of fairness and stability in negotia-
tions, since neither party is permitted to overwhelm the other.5
Given the positive attributes of arbitration, it would seem an
appropriate solution to the problems arising out of teacher bargain-
ing under the strike system. Despite its superficial attractiveness,
however, arbitration's weaknesses render it more politically untena-
ble than teachers' strikes. Arbitration is antithetical to the basic con-
cept of collective negotiations and to precepts of democratic
government.
B. The Weaknesses of Arbitration
1. Arbitration and Bargaining.-When assessed from the ideal of a
mutual, voluntary resolution of differences, arbitration has a pro-
nounced tendency to inhibit genuine bargaining because, rather than
engaging in realistic negotiations, the parties select the less painful
alternative of arbitration. One critic argues that:
Arbitration will be invoked because one or both sides believe
that an arbitration award may be more favorable than a negoti-
ated agreement and because one or both believe the costs of us-
ing arbitration are comparatively low (none of the trauma and
costs of a work stoppage and none of the uncertainty of using
other forms of political influence). As a result of this cost-benefit
calculus, the availability of arbitration may have a "chilling ef-
fect" upon the parties' efforts to negotiate an agreement, and
over time there may be a "narcotic effect" as the parties become
arbitration addicts who habitually rely on arbitrators to write
their labor contracts.58
It may be argued that the chilling and narcotic effects of arbi-
tration are an unavoidable consequence of the process itself. Unlike
strikes, which result in deprivation to the parties, arbitration is rela-
plete repeal of Act 312, or, alternatively, substantial modification.
Id. at 512.
57. Horton, Arbitration, Arbitrators and the Public Interest, 28 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REv. 497 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Arbitration].
58. Feuille, Selected Benefits and Costs of Compulsory Arbitration, 33 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REv. 64, 73 (1979).
tively inexpensive and entails virtually no risk of loss. At worst, the
arbitrator will simply decline to grant a particular demand, and the
"losing" party remains in substantially the same position. Further,
once the procedure is invoked, reliance on the process becomes pre-
dictable behavior in future negotiations.5 9 Thus, while arbitration
minimizes strikes, it does little to encourage the parties to bargain
for agreement. The only means by which it might do so would be to
increase the costs of disagreement incurred by the parties in invoking
the arbitration process.
For example, in Pennsylvania police officers and firefighters are
exempted from Act 195. Bargaining for these employees is governed
by Act 111,60 which provides for arbitration to resolve impasses in
negotiations. Data pertinent to Pennsylvania's experience support the
contention that arbitration produces a "narcotic" effect. According
to a recent study of arbitration under Act 111:
Pennsylvania's police and firefighters' arbitration system has had
by far the highest proportion of negotiations ending in arbitra-
tion awards of any system under review in this volume. Consist-
ently, over a fifteen-year period, a quarter or more of all negoti-
ations for a new contract have been resolved by a binding
arbitration award. An especially high percentage of all disputes
arriving at arbitration each year comes with no issues settled
beforehand, which is a clear indication that bilateral collective
bargaining is not being used effectively."
The 1978 Commission Report which evaluated public sector
bargaining legislation in Pennsylvania echoed these conclusions."
After reviewing the arbitration method and its results, a minority of
the Commission concluded that:
The arbitration process is not conducive to good faith collective
bargaining. When both parties know binding arbitration is the
final impasse procedure, little bargaining will take place. In-
stead, each side will put forth maximum proposals and refuse to
make concessions for fear of eroding their bargaining positions
when the impasse ultimately goes to arbitration.63
The minority recommended elimination of binding arbitration as a
means of dispute resolution.
59. Studies tracking successive rounds of negotiations in the same bargaining units
"have concluded that (I) an increasing pattern of dependence on impasse procedures is ob-
served overtime, and (2) the reliance on a particular procedure in one round of bargaining
increases the probability that the same procedure will again be invoked in subsequent rounds."
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, supra note 9, at 296.
60. See supra note 18.
61. R. LESTER, LABOR ARBITRATION IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 24 (1984).
62. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 32.
63. Id. at 32.
Academic studies of the chilling and narcotic effects of arbitra-
tion, while not altogether conclusive, generally tend to support such
criticisms of the process. One early study found that, in states pro-
viding for arbitration, a consistently greater number of firefighter ne-
gotiations ended in impasse as compared with impasses in states pro-
viding only for mediation and factfinding."' The author concluded
that the findings "would appear to lend some support to the argu-
ment that arbitration has a 'narcotic effect' on bargaining. ''" Subse-
quent studies confirm that conclusion.66
A recent survey of research on the subject analyzed the results
of thirty-two nonlaboratory studies dealing with the impact of arbi-
tration on negotiations. 67 The survey distinguishes between the "chil-
ling" effect and the "narcotic" effect. The former assumes that if
arbitration is available to resolve impasses, the parties will be less
inclined to make concessions in bargaining. The latter suggests that
there will be an "increased probability of using arbitration given pre-
vious use of the procedure."68
With respect to arbitration as an inhibitor of bargaining, the
survey suggests that most research tests the "chilling" effect by ex-
amining the percentage of settlements at each stage of the impasse
procedure. A relatively higher proportion of settlements through ar-
bitration indicates the chilling effect. 6 However, if the chilling effect
is tested by examining movement in bargaining prior to arbitration,
the effect is significantly diminished. Under that criterion, "it is diffi-
cult to conclude that a chilling effect actually exists."1
70
The survey concludes that the effectiveness of compulsory arbi-
tration is unknown. 71 Since available research is limited not only in
terms of the criteria used to evaluate effectiveness, but also in terms
of design and methodology, "the weight of evidence supporting the
chilling and narcotic effects rests on a few quasi-experimental studies
64. Wheeler, Compulsory Arbitration: A "Narcotic" Effect? 14 INDUS. REL. 117
(1975).
65. Id. at 120.
66. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, supra note 9, at 296. See also Dispute Resolution,
supra note 6, at 171-75.
67. Anderson, The Impact of Arbitration: A Methodological Assessment, 20 INDUS.
REL. 130 (1981).
68. Id. at 131.
69. Id. at 134. Anderson found that "[bly far the most popular hypothesis tested [in
the studies] was the chilling effect of arbitration on collective bargaining. Twenty-one studies
used the proportion of cases resolved at arbitration as a measure of the chilling effect, and
most concluded that the effect was present."
70. Id.
71. Id. at 144. A recent study, echoing this conclusion, asserts that "[tlhe empirical
evidence on this important issue [the narcotic effect] is quite unclear." Chelius & Extejt, The
Narcotic Effect of Impasse Resolution Procedures, 38 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 629 (1985). But
cf. infra note 78 (other authorities are to the contrary).
of a small number of jurisdictions."72
Despite the somewhat ambiguous and inconclusive evidence of
the empirical investigations, the tendency of arbitration to deter gen-
uine bargaining can be established on a theoretical level by deduc-
tive modeling. One expert proposes a negotiations model based on
the hypothesis that whether arbitration provides an incentive to ne-
gotiation "can only be determined by a comparison of uncertain and
costly arbitrated settlements with uncertain and costly negotiated
settlements.173 The assumption underlying the model is that a
party's estimation of cost relative to its certainty is the motivator of
bargaining.
"The chilling effect arises when arbitration reduces the uncer-
tainty surrounding the outcome of a labor dispute or when arbitra-
tion yields an expected savings in the direct cost of reaching a settle-
ment."7  Thus, increasing the costs of arbitration relative to the costs
of negotiation will serve to overcome the chilling effect. Since the
parties will have an incentive to negotiate when there is less uncer-
tainty regarding the outcome and costs of negotiation than when
there is uncertainty concerning the outcome and costs of arbitration:
Perhaps the most important conclusion that can be drawn for
policymakers from [the results of the model] is that the imple-
mentation of compulsory arbitration is likely to subvert and at-
tenuate collective bargaining when the parties view this mecha-
nism as the least costly alternative for establishing a contract.
Especially in situations where the arbitration mechanism re-
places the strike as the instrument by which the parties can im-
pose costs of disagreement on each other, it would not be at all
surprising to observe a lower incidence of voluntarily negotiated
settlements.7"
Moreover, legislators who desire to protect the public from the ex-
pense of strikes by enacting arbitration provisions should recognize
that arbitration may only serve to insulate the negotiating parties
from the costs of their disagreements. 6
The above model does not contemplate the option of final-offer
arbitration, which might provide an alternative by which to avoid the
72. Anderson, The Impact of Arbitration: A Methodological Assessment, 20 INDUS.
Rl.. 130, 145 (1981).
73. Bloom, Is Arbitration Really Compatible with Bargaining?, 20 INDUS. REL. 233,
235-36 (1981).
74. Id. at 240. Bloom also argues that the chilling effect does not arise from the par-
ties' assumption that an arbitrator will "split the difference" between the respective positions,
but rather from the parties' "maximizing behavior," activity which is reduced to the extent
that uncertainty is reduced.
75. Id. at 243.
76. Id.
problem of disagreement's relatively low costs. The final-offer
method may entail potentially greater costs because it forces the ar-
bitrator to choose between extreme positions. Presumably, in this
event the parties will sufficiently moderate their demands to reach
agreement, but as one arbitrator has observed:
Although [final-offer arbitration] would appear to stimulate the
parties to set forth their true final demands, it need not in fact
elicit such honesty. Each side is bound to frame its last offer in
the light of what it believes will be forthcoming from the other
side. And indeed, the "last offer" from both might be little dif-
ferent from their initial positions, placing the arbitrator in an
untenable position if he wishes to issue an award which is most
likely to provide the greatest assurance of the parties' continuing
in a good ongoing relationship. Additionally, the number of is-
sues which traditionally constitute an impasse make a simple
choice of one side's last offer by the arbitrator not only weighty
but, more importantly, conducive to destruction rather than im-
provement in the parties' relationship.7
7
Thus, final-offer arbitration fails as a panacea for arbitration's inher-
ent weaknesses as a method of impasse resolution.
In summary, arbitration is inconsistent with the ideal of negoti-
ated settlement of bargaining impasses. Empirical evidence supports
the chilling and narcotic effects of arbitration,78 and the relatively
trivial cost of arbitration encourages negotiators to rely on that pro-
cedure rather than engaging in realistic bargaining. At best, arbitra-
tion provides a strike substitute rather than a device for motivating
the parties to reach a negotiated labor agreement.
2. The Arbitrator and the Political Process.-Mediation and
factfinding have no binding effect on the parties, who remain free to
accept or reject any recommendations. Since arbitration results in a
final and binding disposition of disputed issues, it is both a substitute
77. Zack, Impasses, Strikes and Resolutions, in PUBLIC WORKERS AND PUBLIC UN-
IONS 120 (S. Zagoria ed. 1972). See also, Feigenbaum, Final Offer Arbitration: Better Theory
Than Practice, 14 INDUS. REL. 311 (1975) (final-offer arbitration plausible only in theory; has
no greater deterrent effect than conventional interest arbitration; final-offer arbitration awards
are significantly almost inevitably worse than conventional ones).
78. A recent survey concludes that "[a]lthough there has been no methodologically
perfect study proving or disproving the existence of the chilling effect, the substantial experi-
ence of many employers and employees suggests that such an effect does exist." Note, Devel-
opments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1710 (1984). The availa-
ble data on the narcotic effect of arbitration leads "both friends and foes of arbitration" to
acknowledge a demonstrable tendency towards increasing reliance on the process. Id. at 1711.
Thus, "although arbitration initially seems to offer a fair and practical alternative both to the
strike and to the unilateral resolution of impasses by public employers, it is an alternative with
serious drawbacks - drawbacks that are intensified by the chilling and narcotic effects." Id.
at 1712.
for strikes and a significant method of strike prevention. Neverthe-
less, arbitration may be inconsistent with our system of democratic
government because arbitration involves decision-making by private
citizens who are not accountable to the public.
In contrast, democratic decision-making is premised upon proce-
dures by which duly elected representatives enact laws and imple-
ment policies. These representatives are regularly accountable to the
public through the election process. Additionally, democracy's par-
ticipatory nature and the substantive distribution of benefits
achieved through this system have a value independent of the deci-
sion-making accountability.
79
Several commentators argue against arbitration from the stand-
point of political theory. One of the more forceful articulations rec-
ognizes that decisions made during collective bargaining negotiations
vitally affect the public.8 0 If an arbitrator makes these decisions, citi-
zens lose the right to influence the final result in the dispute. It de-
prives them of a meaningful opportunity to participate in the resolu-
tion process. While some degree of delegation is a necessary
ingredient in democratic government, the power afforded arbitrators
to affect decision-making far exceeds the permissible limits of
delegation. 81
This rationale uses the political theory criticism as a basis for
rejection of public sector unionism. An inherent conflict between
public bargaining and democratic decision-making arises because the
negotiations process requires the "sharing" of power with a private
group:
[T]he statutes do not obligate the public employer to agree with
any particular union proposals for the exercise of this authority.
But if the public employer refuses to agree to union proposals
within the scope of bargaining, the statutes generally provide for
"impasses resolution" procedures in which third-party neutrals
intervene. For this intervention to be effective, that is, for it to
lead to "settlements," these third parties must work out accom-
modations that inevitably effectuate some union proposals.
Where statutes provide for compulsory arbitration to determine
"terms and conditions of employment," as they increasingly do,
democracy is diminished even further, for the arbitrator is the
79. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A TIIEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
80. R. SUMMERS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND PUBLIC BENEFIT CONFERRAL: A JU-
RISPRUDENTIAL CRITIQUE (1976) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC BENEFIT CONFERRAL].
81. Summers' argument commences with the proposition that "'[bjefore the enactment
of bargaining laws, public employing bodies had exclusive power (subject to the control of or
accountable to the public) to make and administer laws and policies about personnel [deci-
sions]." Id. at 3. The derogation of democratic decisionmaking, he contends, is thus to be
measured from the perspective of complete employer discretion, subject only to electoral
restraints.
decision maker - a private party who does not even share pub-
lic power with a public employer.
8 2
Thus, in terms of democratic ideals, arbitration is an unacceptable
method of conflict resolution, regardless of its effectiveness in mini-
mizing strikes.
A similar attack on arbitration asserts that "interest arbitration
is inimical to a basic precept of political democracy, namely, that
authoritative political decisions should be reached by government of-
ficials who are accountable to the public. '83 This formulation sug-
gests that the fundamental defect of arbitration lies not in the nature
of arbitrators' decisions, but in the process by which arbitrators
reach those decisions. To assure continued employment, arbitrators
"must consider the personal as well as labor relations consequences
of their arbitration decisions."' Arbitrators are "politically" moti-
vated. The arbitrator is not unlike "political leader[s] who must dis-
pense patronage in an environment where more than one claimant to
patronage exists."'8 5 The alleged "expertise" of the neutral thus fails
to justify arbitration as a method of dispute resolution.
It is argued that an adequate theory of the "public interest"
must consider three propositions. First, there are conflicts of interest
among groups affected by the labor relations process. The basic con-
flict arises between labor and the public, not between labor and man-
agement.8 6 Second, the labor relations process redistributes re-
sources. Third, all groups do not benefit equally from that
redistribution. Following these theoretical premises, arbitration is an
inappropriate vehicle for allocating public resources. To strengthen
the labor relations process and minimize reliance on arbitration, the
legislature should legalize certain public employee strikes. If arbitra-
tion must be employed, arbitrators should be selected at random and
should meet minimal levels of competence before admission to the
arbitration panel.8 7 In general, however, "[n]o readily foreseeable re-
82. Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
83. Arbitration, supra note 57, at 499. Horton also observes that arbitrators are by
design shielded from accountability.
84. Id. at 500-01.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 502-03. Horton's perception of the tension between labor and the public is
significant in the context of educational bargaining. In some instances, public officials, rather
than aligning their labor relations objectives with those of the public, pursue re-election strate-
gies. Current impasse resolution mechanisms, including the strike, fail to provide the public
direct control over the negotiations process, and cannot impose the costs of disagreement on
the union (for example, by replacement of striking teachers). Only designated public officials
can initiate action; elected school board members are not necessarily responsive to the desires
of the individual citizen because political change in school districts occurs only when groups
oppose board policies. Id. See also infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text. Thus, as Horton
contends, existing dispute resolution procedures may actually impede the public interest.
87. Arbitration, supra note 57, at 506-07.
forms could overcome the objection to interest-arbitration based on
political democracy, short of eliminating arbitration or electing
arbitrators." 88
From the perspective of resource allocation by means of demo-
cratic procedures, the above commentaries appear unassailable. If
accountability forms the touchstone of democratic decisionmaking,
then arbitration is conceptually repugnant to that process. While
theoretical clarity is not typically a criterion of acceptability in our
political system, the conflict between arbitration and democracy re-
mains intractable.
IV. The Referendum Model
This section proposes an alternative dispute resolution frame-
work that incorporates various features of the impasse techniques
previously discussed. The Referendum Model89 presents each step of
the procedure with an accompanying commentary. The procedure
assumes integration within a larger statutory scheme such as Act
195. While the Model is applicable to all public employees, its par-
ticular relevance to teacher bargaining is developed in Part V.
Step 1. Notification of Impasse.-The parties engaged in nego-
tiations for a public sector labor agreement are required to notify the
Board of a bargaining impasse. Notification will be in the form of a
summary statement of the issue or issues in dispute and the respec-
tive positions of the parties with regard to the dispute. If the parties
cannot agree on the contents of the notification, each party may sub-
mit its own statement. Either party may declare an issue or the ne-
88. Id. at 507.
89. The Regional Transportation District Strike, supra note 3 first proposed the
Model. It was subsequently developed in Hogler & Kriksciun, Impasse Resolution in Public
Sector Collective Negotiations: A Proposed Procedure, 6 INDUS. REL. L.J. 481 (1984) [herein-
after cited as Impasse Resolution]. For a treatment of the Model in relation to the educational
system generally, see Hogler & Thompson, Collective Negotiations in Education and the Pub-
lic Interest: A Proposed Method of Impasse Resolution, 14 J. LAW & EDUC. 443 (1985).
Certain perceived weaknesses in the theory were pointed out in Hansen & Allen, Public Refer-
endum: Is it an Effective Mechanism for Resolving Collective Bargaining Impasses? A Union
Response, 14 J. LAW & EDUC. 471 (1985). The present work responds to those criticisms by
focusing on the specific collective bargaining experience in education in one state. The viability
of the Model thus becomes much more apparent.
One empirical study concludes that public referenda are not an effective means of resolv-
ing collective bargaining impasses. Barnum & Helburn, Influencing the Electorate: Experience
with Referenda on Public Employee Bargaining, 35 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 330, 342
(1982). The study, however, examined elections involving collective bargaining legislation
rather than impasses in negotiations. Therefore, the authors' conclusions are of limited validity
relative to the Model proposed here. A more pertinent example is the case study of the Denver
Firefighters' referendum election described in Impasse Resolution, supra at 500-503.
gotiations to be at impasse.
Comment
Although either party may declare one or more issues or the
entire negotiations to be at impasse, the Model encourages bargain-
ing by making the consequences of impasse extremely onerous. Once
the parties reach impasse neither has the power unilaterally to termi-
nate the process of resolution. Since both parties must proceed to the
final step unless they agree otherwise, impasse will occur only when
a party is prepared to incur the costs of disagreement.
The written notification is also an important feature. The par-
ties may submit a statement of their positions on each impassed item
either jointly or separately. In either case, unless the parties agree
otherwise, the notification fixes certain ballot options available under
Step Four.
Step 2. Mediation.-Within ten days, the Board will appoint a
mediator to mediate the dispute at no cost to the parties. The par-
ties, alternatively, may select and compensate their own mediator, if
approved by the Board. The parties will be given a ten-day period to
attempt, with the assistance of the mediator, to resolve the impasse.
Following the mediation period, the mediator will report in writing
concerning the impasse. The Board in its discretion may make the
mediator's report public.
Comment
Mediation has proved a useful tool in resolving disputes when
the parties have a genuine desire to reach agreement and the negoti-
ations are within a "zone" of contract.90 Under the Model, media-
tion will also prove valuable, since the parties here have a greater
incentive to bargain than under other formulations.
The mediator's report may contribute to bringing the parties to-
ward agreement. Since the report may figure in a referendum elec-
tion described in Step Four, the parties will be encouraged to moder-
ate their positions in anticipation of a vote. Sufficient movement
might thus lead to settlement. Additionally, the Board's actual or
threatened publication of the report offers the parties further incen-
tive to justify their demands.
Step 3. Factfinding.-If mediation is not successful, the Board
will direct the parties to engage in factfinding. The Board will ap-
point the factfinder, including, in its discretion, a factfinder jointly
requested by the parties. The proceeding will include a hearing with
90. See generally COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, supra note 9, at 272-284.
the introduction of evidence, examination of witnesses, and argu-
ment. At the conclusion of the hearing, the factfinder will issue a
written report resolving each impassed matter, with a statement of
reasoning in support of the recommendation. The report shall be
made public. On a designated date no later than ten days following
issuance of the report, the parties shall simultaneously serve notice
on the Board indicating acceptance or rejection of any or all of the
findings. The parties shall have an additional five-day period thereaf-
ter to engage in bargaining.
Comment
The factfinding process maximizes the risk of a detrimental out-
come for both parties. The most basic risk is that the loser may re-
ject the factfinder's disposition of any or all issues, thus forcing the
winner to either capitulate to the loser's demands or proceed through
another step in the Model's procedure. Since both parties decide
whether to accept or reject before learning the other's decision, the
negotiator will tend to adopt a conservative strategy, accepting the
factfinder's disposition if possible. A rejection of the factfinder's de-
termination, particularly if one party has accepted it, will push the
dispute into the next phase of the procedure and might lead to eco-
nomic or political trauma. Since neither side will desire to attribute
an irrational mentality to the other, factfinding might result in a vol-
untary resolution, the parties electing to abide by the factfinder's re-
port as a disposition in their best interests. Thus, in practice,
factfinding will remain consistent with its theoretical assumptions.91
Step Three also contains one final inducement to agreement.
After the report is made public, the parties have an additional period
in which to negotiate. If either party wishes to reconsider its previous
position in light of public opinion, it has the opportunity to do so.
However, the factfinding winner retains an advantage, since the loser
has the burden of initiating the next phase.
Step 4. Referendum.-If the collective bargaining representa-
tive rejects any or all of the factfinder's recommendations, it may
submit the impasse to a referendum of the electorate. The choices on
the ballot shall be the factfinder's recommendation on the particular
issue and the proposal which the representative submitted to im-
passe. The cost of the election shall be borne by the representative,
and the election commission may require adequate funds to be
91. Theoretically, the factfinder's report should generate such public pressure that the
parties will accept the recommendations. McKelvey, Factfinding: Promise or Illusion, 22 IN-
DUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 543 (1969). However, "[e]very study of factfinding in the public sector
has concluded . . . that it has not had this effect." COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, supra note 9, at
293.
placed in escrow.
If the representative and the employer both reject any or all of
the factfinder's recommendations, a referendum shall be held. The
choices on the ballot shall be the respective positions of the parties
prior to factfinding, as contained in the mediator's report. Alterna-
tively, the parties may mutually agree to the specific language of the
ballot. In the event of a joint referendum, the cost of the election
shall be shared equally between the representative and the employer.
Comment
The Model's key feature is the referendum election,9 2 a device
providing for direct public participation. However, the public em-
ployer may not, at its option, invoke the referendum mechanism.
Otherwise, public officials could refer every difficult question to an
electoral vote and thus avoid the responsibility of controversial deci-
sions. If the union representative rejects the factfinder's report, it can
appeal to the public and assume the costs for exercising that right.93
If both sides disagree, the election costs are shared equally. Presum-
ably, employer representatives who expend public funds on a refer-
endum and suffer defeat may be threatened with loss of position in
the next general election.
Step 5. Strike.-If the employer rejects any or all of the
factfinder's recommendations, the labor organization shall be permit-
ted to undertake a strike, provided it furnishes notice of its intent to
do so at least ten days prior to the commencement of the action.
Once the strike is actually in progress, the employer may petition the
Board for an order declaring the strike to be an immediate and sig-
nificant hazard to the public welfare and enjoining employees from
further strike activity. If the employer seeks and obtains such an
order, the factfinder's disposition of the impasse shall be imple-
mented as the terms of the labor agreement.
Comment
The Model proposes that all public employees, including police
officers and firefighters, be afforded a right to strike. Three specific
safeguards in the system protect the public interest. First, the union
cannot strike unless the employer rejects the factfinder's award. If
officials believe a strike would cause serious harm to the public, they
can prevent a strike by implementing the award. Thus, the employer
92. The concept of a referendum election to resolve bargaining impasses originated in
Englewood, Colorado. See Impasse Resolution, supra note 89, at 500 n. 117.
93. Denver, Colorado's city charter authorizes referendum elections to resolve bargain-
ing impasses. On one occasion, a local firefighters union used the procedure at a cost of
$160,000, or approximately $360 per union member. The citizens voted in favor of the union's
position. See Impasse Resolution, supra note 89, at 500-503.
has the exclusive control of the strike option.
Second, citizens threatened with a strike who make their views
known to the appropriate officials have an opportunity to influence
the strike decision and to choose whether to suffer the hardship of a
strike in exchange for lower service costs. Presumably, the more vital
the service, the more vociferous and animated the public debate. If it
appears that the strike will enjoy little or no public support, only
foolhardy unions will proceed.9 ' Conversely, if there is support for
the strike, the employer may choose to offer concessions, thus avoid-
ing the work stoppage.
Third, the public employer can attempt to enjoin the strike once
it has commenced on the ground that it poses an immediate and sub-
stantial hazard to the public welfare. The disincentive for obtaining
an injunction is that the factfinder's disposition is enforced as the
terms of the contract. Officials risk suffering a substantial loss of
public esteem if, by forcing a harmful strike on the electorate, they
gain nothing from the tactic.
These features eliminate any serious objections to affording
public employees, including teachers, an opportunity to strike. The
strike does not generate undue political pressure because the public
decides whether to accede to the factfinder's award or to suffer the
work stoppage, and because the threat of a strike is removed from
union control. 95 Additionally, a harmful strike may be enjoined.
Thus, a community can be threatened by a public employees' work
stoppage only if the employer determines that a strike is in the pub-
lic's best interests.
V. The Model and School Governance
A. A Theory of Political Change in Local School Districts
To determine whether the theory of democratic governance op-
erates successfully in the educational system, it is first necessary to
formulate a coherent theory to test the presence or absence of demo-
94. For an analysis of the importance of public support to unions engaged in a public
sector work stoppage, see Impasse Resolution, supra note 89, and Dynamics of Dispute Reso-
lution, supra note 6, at 163-69.
95. The political impact of public sector strikes has occasioned substantial debate. One
contention is that public strikes exert undue pressure on public officials and distort the political
process. Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78
YALE L.J. 1107 (1969). But see Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by
Public Employees, 79 YALE L. 418 (1970). The California Supreme Court recently held that
public employees are not prohibited at common law from engaging in work stoppages against a
public employer. County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees Ass'n Local
660, 38 Cal.3d 564, 699 P.2d 835, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1985) (little empirical evidence to
demonstrate that governments generally capitulate to unreasonable demands by public employ-
ees to resolve strikes). For a further analysis, see Hogler, The Common Law of Public Em-
ployee Strikes: A New View in California, 37 LAB. L.J. - (forthcoming February 1986).
cratic control. Three major concepts of control have been devel-
oped."6 The first theory of democratic control in school districts is
based on the concept of "continuous competition." Underlying the
theory is "the general belief that democracy is especially concerned
with universal citizen participation.19 7 The theory is based on the
"essential criterion position" that "democracy requires the regular,
continuous political competition and opposition among a wide range
of informed groups with diverse interests in policy decisions."98 Since
voter turnout in school board elections is relatively low, incumbents
are usually re-elected, and few issues attract widespread community
attention, adherents of this theory conclude that "present school dis-
trict governments are fundamentally and perhaps unredeemably un-
democratic," and board members tend to function as mere figure-
heads for school superintendents.99
The second theory of school governance is the "decision output"
theory, which defines democracy as a congruence between the desires
of citizens and the response of the school system. This theory places
emphasis on board members' reactions to public demands, and
"[t]he correspondence between what officials do and what their con-
stituents or clients would have them do or need is the key criterion
value for judging the democratic character of local school polit-
ics." 100 Unfortunately, the "decision output" theory lacks any capac-
ity to predict or explain democratic control on a general level. Each
case must be examined on its own merits to determine whether the
school district met the expectations of the electorate and thereby sat-
isfied the criterion of democracy.
A third theory of school governance finds our educational sys-
tem highly democratic in quality and subject to meaningful control
by interested citizens, provided democracy is understood as the
power of the electorate to oust incumbents. This model is based on a
theory of "dissatisfaction." Change occurs in school districts only
when there is such a divergence between the desires of the governing
elite and the popular will that public frustration with educational
policy reaches a critical level. A predictable pattern of political up-
heaval then produces the change. "[D]issatisfaction theory identifies
democratic control with episodic adjustment of school district policy
to the will or value of the larger community, rather than with any
minimum level of continuous competition or correspondence in ad-
96. F. LUTZ AND L. IANNACCONE, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN LOCAL SCHOOL DIs-
TRICTS: THE DISSATISFACTION THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1977) [hereinafter cited as DISSATIS-
FACTION THEORY].
97. Id. at 126.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 128.
ministrative decisions to client needs."10 1 To adequately understand
the politics of local school districts, it must first be realized that "the
political myth of regular widespread participation in self-government
is unrealistic and unsupported by empirical evidence in any represen-
tative or democratic society on which we have data, from Athens to
date."102
Viewed as the capacity of one group to unseat those in power,
democracy flourishes in local school districts. Control is effectuated
in a well-defined progression beginning with citizen dissatisfaction
(DIS), which results in the incumbent board member's defeat (ID),
followed by involuntary superintendent turnover (STO) and outside
succession (OS). This theory is now well established in over a decade
of research across the United States, and "whatever the room for
improvement, the American school district is fundamentally a suc-
cessful democratic government. Thus the most important practical
implication is to strengthen the local school district. 10 3
B. The Educational Theory and the Model
If the dissatisfaction theory is correct, and democratic control in
school districts arises through episodic adjustment prompted by citi-
zen dissatisfaction, the Referendum Model is an ideal mechanism for
resolving conflict within school districts. Initially, it would be advan-
tageous to provide for political intervention in educational policy at
routine intervals. Affording voters an opportunity to approve or dis-
approve the negotiations process would produce change on an institu-
tionalized basis. The knowledge that they would participate in
resolving bargaining impasses would encourage citizens to follow col-
lective negotiations with interest, endorsing or rejecting school board
members' views in a referendum election. Rejection of a member's
position might contribute to the member's defeat in the next school
board election, replacement of superintendent, and a change in edu-
cational policy.
Similarly, if the democratic process in school systems originates
in conflict, the Referendum Model will focus and confine conflict to
clearly defined channels of resolution. For example, an impasse in
101. Id. at 130.
102. Id. This conclusion contrasts sharply with Summers' position in PUBLIC BENEFIT
CONFERRAL, supra note 80; "In nearly all aspects of local educational decision making, power-
ful interest groups did not hold sway. There are usually substantial citizen interest and partici-
pation in school policy at local levels, and elected officials were by law accountable and fre-
quently responsive." Id. at 2. From this observation, which is unsupported by authority,
Summers concludes that educational bargaining is incompatible with the democratic control of
education. The theory developed by Lutz and lannaccone, however, would tend to strengthen
the role of collective bargaining in education. See Part V (B) of this article.
103. DISSATISFACTION THEORY, supra note 96, at 131-32.
negotiations might involve an issue with significant implications for
the public interest."" The Model assures the issue's presentation in a
specific context, with both parties attempting to clarify their posi-
tions and gain public support.10 5 Moreover, citizens may express
their views through a mechanism with direct and immediate impact,
rather than through the attenuated procedure of electing a board
member sympathetic to those views. Both the parties and the public
benefit because the conflict is resolved in an orderly fashion with a
minimum of trauma.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the Model assures the
citizen a voice in educational bargaining. The structure of bargain-
ing systems demands that the employer negotiate exclusively with
the designated bargaining representative.' No other group has ei-
ther a statutory"' or a constitutional" 8 right to participate in negoti-
ations. The Referendum Model preserves the concept of exclusive
representation while providing formal public access in the event of
impasse. Thus, the Model has an important advantage over both
striking and arbitration.
C. Implementation Through Local Option
In view of past unsuccessful attempts to modify Act 195 as it
pertains to teacher strikes, any future efforts at reforms would seem
certain to fail. For example, the State's two major teachers' unions
opposed the 1984 Senate task force report in several crucial respects.
Both the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers and the Pennsylvania
State Education Association disagreed with the recommendation
that school days lost to strikes should not be made up after June 15
in any school year.' 0 9 In addition to this opposition, three task force
members disagreed at least partially with the report." 0 Senator
104. For example, in 1984, the Chicago, Illinois school board attempted to cut employee
pay and benefits by $37 million. A total of 40,000 school employees, including 24,000 teachers,
commenced a work stoppage which closed 596 public schools with an enrollment of 430,000
students. Chicago Tribune, Dec. 4, 1984, at I, col. 2 and at 2, col. 1.
105. For a treatment of the parties' campaigns in the Denver referendum, see Impasse
Resolution. supra note 89, at 500-03.
106. E.g., Lullo v. Fire Fighters, Local 1066, 55 N.J. 409, 262 A.2d 681 (1970) (up-
holding the constitutionality of the state's collective bargaining law providing for exclusive
representation by one bargaining agent).
107. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.606 (Purdon Supp. 1985) ("Representatives
selected by public employes in a unit appropriate for collective bargaining purposes shall be
the exclusive representative of all the employes in such unit. ... ).
108. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (rejecting attack on state
collective bargaining law as violative of U.S. Constitution with respect to exclusive representa-
tion). See also Minnesota State Bd. of Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 104
S.Ct. 1058 (1984) (the U.S. Constitution does not grant the public a right to be heard by
public bodies making decisions of policy).
109. The Pittsburgh Press, June 20, 1984, at 84, col. I.
I10. Id.
Michael Fisher, the Chairman, observed that "it was difficult to get
a consensus among legislators for changes in the state public em-
ployee law."'1 Thus, a different approach to the problem of legisla-
tive change is necessary.
Since education is regarded as a matter particularly within the
province of local control," 2 any modification of educational bargain-
ing should be effected at the school district level. One strategy would
afford local school districts the option of resolving bargaining im-
passes through the Referendum Model rather than by means of the
strike model. An amendment to Act 195 allowing for the dispute
resolution alternative would accomplish this. If the community se-
lected the Referendum Model during a general election, the Model's
procedures, rather than those of Articles VII and X of Act 195
would govern school negotiations. Thus, districts could experiment
with impasse procedures to determine which is more suitable to local
conditions. " 3
Neither organized labor nor any other group would have tenable
grounds to oppose the legislative strategy just described. Even if la-
bor did not generally favor the Referendum Model, it could hardly
argue that the community should not have an opportunity to express
its opinion at the voting booth. Rejecting the local option concept
would be tantamount to rejecting the principle that local democratic
control is the foundation of our educational system.'" By exerting
political pressure, however, teachers in the district could defeat the
Referendum Model."
5
Furthermore, the state legislators could not rationally vote
against such a measure, since the local option provision would
merely refer a legislative choice to the electorate. The general electo-
rate is as capable of making a choice in this particular instance as
Ill. Id.
112. See PUBLIC BENEFIT CONFERRAL, supra note 80. According to Summers, public
sector bargaining has pernicious consequences in the field of education because local school
districts are democratic institutions.
113. Specifically, the framework set forth in steps 1-5 in Part IV of this article could be
added as § 1101.808 of title 43, PA. STAT. ANN. The section would contain a proviso that,
during a general election, the voters within a school district could choose to implement the
Referendum Model rather than the procedures of Act 195. Thus, the substantive provisions of
Act 195 would not be altered at the state level.
114. As Lutz and lannaccone conclude, the implication of their research is that local
school districts should be strengthened through enhancement of democratic tendencies. See
supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text. Arguably, the major defect of Act 195 with re-
spect to teacher bargaining is that it precludes any local control over negotiations.
115. In the Denver referendum election discussed in Impasse Resolution, supra note 89,
the union persuaded a majority of voters to support is position. That study demonstrates the
political effectiveness of a labor organization conducting an intense grass-roots campaign
within a community. Presumably, a group of teachers could defeat any measure demonstrably
contrary to the goal of quality education.
the elected representative. 116 Moreover, since legislators would not
be advocating any position, but merely permitting their constituents
to do so, they would avoid antagonizing powerful pressure groups.'
17
A final advantage supporting the local option strategy is the
benefit to the public generally. The repeated criticisms of teacher
strikes have yet to result in legislative change, and such inactivity
prompts further dissatisfaction with the bargaining system. By per-
mitting a local option, citizens will at least be afforded a voice. Even
a vote to retain the strike procedures under Act 195 is the public's
expression of its opinion on educational negotiations-a vote to
maintain the status quo is a vote. In either case, the community de-
bate over the issue would lead to greater concern for the school
system.
VI. Conclusion
Public sector collective bargaining in this country is character-
ized by diversity and innovation. Pennsylvania's adoption of Act 195
in 1970 placed the state in the forefront of public sector labor rela-
tions. With the exception of educational bargaining, Act 195 has
proved a satisfactory accommodation of the interests of employer,
employee and citizen. School systems, however, are unique entities,
and work stoppages by teachers are not regarded with the same de-
gree of equanimity as those of other public employees. Opposition to
teacher strikes has been persistent and vociferous. The numerous leg-
islative proposals concerning teacher bargaining attest to the pres-
sures for change, and their predictable defeat attests to the political
forces arrayed against modification of Act 195.
The Referendum Model discussed in this article proposes a
workable alternative to teacher strikes. It permits greater citizen in-
volvement than the strike model, and it comports with a recognized
116. Act 195 is based on policies which affect the Commonwealth as a whole, and the
statute intends to promote "orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers
and their employes .... " PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Purdon Supp. 1985). Neverthe-
less, the General Assembly also expressly recognized "the paramount right of the citizens of
this Commonwealth to keep inviolate the guarantees for their health, safety and welfare." Id.
The legislative action proposed here is consistent with Act 195's policies since it decentralizes
decisions affecting education, thus permitting both the community as a whole and the individ-
ual citizens to express a choice.
117. Arguably, organized labor would vigorously oppose any modification of the strike
weapon afforded by Act 195, including the right as it pertains specifically to teachers, but it
would be far less tenable for organized labor to oppose a local option. First, since it does not
substantively modify Act 195, the option does not directly implicate labor's interests. Second,
neither organized labor nor the elected state representative has the expertise in local educa-
tional affairs of teachers and citizens within the district. Third, if the Referendum Model is in
fact detrimental to the interests of unionized teachers, then those teachers would undoubtedly
enlist the support of labor at the local level to defeat the option. Regardless, the members of
the community, who have the greatest stake in the matter, should make the choice.
theory of political control in local school districts. Further, its imple-
mentation might avoid strenuous political opposition at the state
level. It thus might succeed where other measure have failed. The
Model offers a unique approach to a problem of political magnitude
and consequence for the state's educational system.
